The best army Ukraine has ever had. Changes in Ukraine’s armed forces since the Russian aggression. OSW Studies 66, July 2017 by Wilk, Andrzej
T h e  b e s T  a r m y  U k r a i n e  h a s  e v e r  h a d
C h a n g e s  i n  U k r a i n e ’ s  a r m e d  f o r C e s  s i n C e
t h e  r U s s i a n  a g g r e s s i o n
a n d r z e j  W i l k
6 6
The besT army Ukraine has ever had
Changes in Ukraine’s armed forCes sinCe 
the rUssian aggression
andrzej Wilk
nUmBer 66
WarsaW
JUly 2017
© Copyright by ośrodek studiów Wschodnich
im. marka karpia / Centre for eastern studies
Content editor
adam eberhardt
editor
małgorzata Zarębska
Co-oPeration
anna Łabuszewska, katarzyna kazimierska
translation
Jim todd
Co-oPeration
nicholas furnival 
graPhiC design 
Para-BUCh
PhotograPh on CoVer
sharomka, shutterstock.com
dtP
groupmedia
maPs
Wojciech mańkowski, andrzej Wilk
PUBlisher
Ośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. marka karpia 
Centre for eastern studies
ul. koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland
Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
isBn 978-83-65827-05-0
Contents
IntroduCtIon   /5
theses   /6
I. the ukraInIan army In the faCe of russIan aggressIon /8
II. defenCe expendIture /12
III. manpower /15
IV. the organIsatIon of the ukraInIan armed forCes /19
V. traInIng /22
VI. equIpment /25
summary /31
Appendix 1. notes on sources   /33
Appendix 2. structure and home bases of the Land forces, airmobile troops 
and marine Corps (general military units and support units)   /35
Appendix 3. the equipment of the ukrainian armed forces (the basic 
categories of armaments according to the treaty on Conventional armed 
forces in europe), as of the beginning of 2017   /38
maps  /40
5O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
17
IntroductIon
In the spring and summer of 2014, for the first time in its history, the Ukrain-
ian army faced the necessity of military involvement to defend its state. After 
initially failing to engage in action with the enemy – in the form of irregular 
armed formations, sent from the territory of Russia, which rapidly took over 
Crimea – and faced with the threat of Ukraine losing the entire eastern and 
southern part of the country and real, direct aggression from Russia, it launched 
military action against the so-called separatists.
Initially, the Ukrainian armed forces’ actions in the Donbas were carried out 
on a small scale and were irregular in nature, based on reacting to the enemy’s 
activity. Along with the systematic increase in the separatists’ potential (thanks 
to Russia), as well as the direct involvement of the Russian Federation’s armed 
forces at a critical period in August 2014, the Ukrainian army’s operations took 
on a regular character, and the entire military potential of Ukraine was in-
volved in defending the territorial integrity of the state. The military activity 
in the Donbas carried out at that time, and to varying degrees of intensity in 
the following months, highlighted the Ukrainian army’s weaknesses, as well as 
its total inability to implement its constitutional duties. This forced the govern-
ment in Kyiv to take real action to clean up the country’s armed forces.
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theses
• The Ukrainian authorities’ decision to counter the Russian aggression in 
Eastern Ukraine by military force entailed the first significant increase in 
defence spending after two decades of stagnation and decline. However, in-
creasing the Defence Ministry’s budget, from 1% of GDP in 2013 to 2.5% of 
GDP in 2015 and 2016, did not provide an impulse for any major investment 
in the technical modernisation and development of the Ukrainian armed 
forces; it merely covered the necessary costs associated with the conduct of 
military operations in the Donbas.
• Within a period of two years, in the relatively difficult situation which the 
Ukrainian state found itself (economic collapse, entanglement in long-lasting 
positional warfare in the east of Ukraine), significant changes were made to 
the Ukrainian army to improve its condition and to make it better suited to 
current challenges. The reform of the system for recruitment to Ukraine’s 
armed forces, and the laying of the foundations for a relatively well-function-
ing system to mobilise reserve troops, should be considered as both the great-
est challenge to and the greatest achievement of the country in that time.
• Reaching a ceiling of 204,000 full-time soldiers in active service should be 
considered as the maximum mobilisation effort which Ukraine can man-
age at the present time. This number guarantees the maintenance of the 
military status quo at this stage, as well as – if Russia remains quiescent – 
the armed re-conquest of that part of the Donbas which is under the control 
of the separatists; however, it will not be enough for effective self-defence if 
Russia launches a campaign of full-scale aggression against Ukraine.
• The threat of full-scale armed aggression by Russia forced Ukraine to make 
the first structural and organisational changes to its army appropriate for 
operational needs since 1992, and to intensify the training process and ex-
tend it to the vast majority of units. In a situation of continued insufficient 
investment in the army (despite its significant growth compared with the 
period before the conflict), the supply of armament and military equip-
ment to the Ukrainian armed forces remains its Achilles heel.
• In the existing financial and technical conditions, considering the rela-
tively modest plans which have been announced for the future, there is no 
chance of the technical modernisation of the Ukrainian army being initi-
ated or implemented in the foreseeable future (before the year 2020).
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• The war in the Donbas has emphasised how far the Ukrainian arms indus-
try still depends on cooperation with Russia. Despite the state’s clear weak-
nesses in the process of reforming the army, Ukraine has managed to create 
the potential to maintain the status quo in the Donbas, and also to under-
take and organise short-term defensive actions in response to any full-
scale Russian aggression, in anticipation of possible support from outside.
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I. the ukraInIan army In the face of russIan 
aggressIon
In the spring of 2014, just after the bloodless occupation of Crimea by the Rus-
sian army, and at the very start of the armed conflict in the Donbas, the Ukrain-
ian army was nearly a quarter-century old. This period can be considered long 
enough for a sovereign state to construct its armed forces from the ground up. 
However, the war in the Donbas has shown that the effective acquisition by 
Ukraine of an almost complete army after the dissolution of the Soviet Union not 
only failed to streamline the process of creating the Ukrainian armed forces, but 
was even a root cause of their failures, at least in the first months of the conflict.
Before the Ukrainian army was formed, on 24 August 1991 the Ukrainian par-
liament, in its declaration of Ukraine’s independence, decided to assume juris-
diction of those units of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union remaining on 
its territory. In fact, however, they remained subordinate to the command in 
Moscow at least until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and for the first weeks 
of the formal existence of the Ukrainian armed forces (between 6 December 
1991, when the parliament in Kyiv adopted a law on the Ukrainian armed forces, 
and 26 December 1991, when the Council of the Republics of the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR adopted the declaration on the dissolution of the Soviet Union), 
they were in fact subject to a form of dual command. The process of formally 
liquidating the ties between the newly created Ukrainian army and its former 
leadership in Moscow lasted more than five years. Its successive stages pro-
ceeded as follows:
 – the Tashkent agreement (15 May 1992), allocating the military limits 
granted to the Soviet Union under the treaty on conventional armed 
forces in Europe among the former Soviet Republics (CFE-1);
 – the Budapest memorandum (5 December 1994), whereby Russia trans-
ferred to Ukraine its nuclear weapons and their strategic means of de-
livery, in exchange for guarantees of the security of Russia, the Unit-
ed States and the United Kingdom (the process of de-nuclearising the 
Ukrainian armed forces was completed in 2000);
 –  the agreement on the division of the Black Sea Fleet of the former Soviet 
Union between Ukraine and Russia (28 May 1997).
Despite the formal separation of the Ukrainian armed forces as the military 
formation of a sovereign state, they remained dependent on cooperation with 
Russia in matters of material-technical security (including the supply of 
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components and spare parts for most of their weapons and military equipment) 
and the training of highly specialised types of troops (the exercises in Russia of 
the air defence troops were led by the returning ‘orange’ defence minister Ana-
toliy Hrytsenko, who had no support in the West). The informal ties between 
the personnel of the Ukrainian armed forces and the Russian army were de 
facto never severed; one consequence of this was the second wave of Ukrain-
ian commanders going over to the Russian side after the annexation of Crimea 
(the first wave had already taken place by the mid-1990s, in connection with 
the exchange of senior personnel between the former Soviet republics on the 
basis of nationality).
Since their establishment, the Ukrainian armed forces have been (and effec-
tively still are) in a state of permanent reform. Until the start of the war in the 
Donbas, however, the only consistent and undisturbed reform process in the 
Ukrainian army involved cuts (of structures, staff and equipment). The ele-
ments essential to the reform of Ukraine’s armed forces, demanding financial 
investments and changes in thinking, such as changing the command structure, 
the recruitment system (i.e. the creation of a professional army) and technical 
modernisation, encountered problems from the beginning, and – apart from the 
formal abolition of conscription in 2013 – have been implemented in piecemeal 
fashion, or (as in the case of technical modernisation) have not started at all. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the main impulse to reform has been 
Ukraine’s orientation towards integrating with Western structures (including 
NATO), and the Ukrainian army has thus become one of the main forums of 
the country’s cooperation with the West. However, the genuine changes related 
to membership in the North Atlantic Alliance have been limited (mainly due 
to the underfunding of defence), and within the Ukrainian armed forces they 
have only been applied to selected individual units. Most of these changes took 
place in the twilight of President Leonid Kuchma’s rule (in the period leading 
up to the so-called ‘orange revolution’), and their crowning glory was the par-
ticipation of a Ukrainian brigade in the American operation in Iraq (as part 
of the Multinational Central-South Division commanded by Poland). During 
the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko, despite the opening of a Westernised di-
rection in the changes in Ukraine, the process of adapting to NATO standards 
underwent a gradual slowdown for financial reasons, and at the beginning of 
the 2010s, during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych, it was put on hold. In 
recent years, in the face of the Russian aggression, defence expenditure has 
oscillated around a figure of 1% of GDP, which not only made it impossible to 
carry out any reforms, but was insufficient even for the current activities of 
the Ukrainian armed forces. This has resulted in the systematic reduction of 
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training, a deterioration in the condition of armaments and military equipment, 
as well as a drop in interest in a professional military career. It has become 
common among the professional staff of the Ukrainian army to make up their 
salaries, which are low even by local standards, by illegally selling off army 
property, as well as by embezzling funds granted for the maintenance of the 
units. Tolerating this state of affairs not only did not help in shaping the new 
mentality of the commanding staff of a sovereign state, but also maintained the 
negative habits acquired during the twilight of the Soviet Union.
In the years immediately preceding the Russian aggression, starting from the 
abandonment of integration with NATO and the restoration of neutral status 
to Ukraine (in July 2010), the Ukrainian armed forces were de facto in a state of 
collapse. It remains an open question how much this was dictated by the fac-
tors mentioned above, which had pushed the Ukrainian army to the margins 
of political life and public interest, and how much it was the result of conscious 
decisions by the Ukrainian authorities (inspired by Russia), under the sole lead-
ership of the Ministry of Defence. Russian infiltration of the Ukrainian armed 
forces’ senior staff was conditioned by historical and social (ethnic Russians 
serving in the Ukrainian army, ties of family and friendship between the per-
sonnel of both armies) as well as economic factors (this became particularly 
visible after salaries in the Russian armed forces were raised in 2012; the dis-
parities in the pay of army personnel serving in the Ukrainian armed forces 
left them in the position of pariahs with regard to their Russian counterparts). 
Nevertheless, the staffing decisions taken at that time indicate that the authori-
ties in Kyiv were at the very least indifferent to improving the situation in the 
area of defence. The most vivid examples of this involve the appointment of the 
Russian businessman Pavel Lebedev as defence minister (he ran the ministry 
from 24 December 2012 to 28 January 2014, although he remained as acting 
minister until 27 February that year); and, after the Russian military operation 
in Crimea, of Admiral Denis Berezovsky as commander of the Ukrainian Navy, 
who defected to Russia on the second day after his appointment (he commanded 
the Ukrainian fleet from 1–2 March 2014, from 2–18 March he was commander-
in-chief of the fleet of the so-called Republic of Crimea, and from 18 March he 
was Deputy Commander of the Russian Black Sea Fleet). This latter case demon-
strates not only the extent to which Russia had infiltrated the Ukrainian armed 
forces’ command, but also the failure of the Ukrainian political elite to discern 
any leadership potential within the personnel of the Ukrainian army (which is 
the aftermath of an earlier lack of political interest in defence issues), as well as 
the limited number of officers who would be able to command the army in the 
event of armed aggression against Ukraine. Even the nominal successes for the 
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reform of the Ukrainian armed forces represented by the abolition of conscrip-
tion (in 2013), and the transition (planned from 2014) to a professional army 
introduced under President Viktor Yanukovych, and guided by the defence 
ministry under Pavel Lebedev, were a factor in effectively weakening Ukraine’s 
defensive potential; the abolition of conscription was not accompanied by the 
creation of a system of recruitment to professional service which met the new 
needs of the Ukrainian armed forces. As a result, when Russian troops invaded 
Crimea, the Ukrainian army was not only poorly trained and equipped; it also 
had insufficient motivation to defend a state whose government had treated it 
not as a guarantor of the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine, but 
as a financial burden.
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II. defence expendIture
The Ukrainian government’s decision to stop the Russian aggression towards 
Eastern Ukraine with armed force brought with it the first significant increase 
in defence spending the country had seen after two decades of stagnation and 
decline. However, raising the defence ministry’s budget from 1% of GDP in 2013 
to 2.5% of GDP in 2015 and 2016 did not make major new investments in mod-
ernisation and development of the Ukrainian armed forces possible; it only cov-
ered the necessary costs associated with the conduct of military operations in 
the Donbas. As in previous years, the vast majority of the funds (approximately 
80%) were absorbed by current expenditures (because of the mobilisation of 
reserves, which had numbered close to 200,000 people at that point, as well as 
greater consumption of materials, armaments and military equipment). This 
state of affairs was maintained in conditions of relative calm and a stable situ-
ation at the front, whereupon the collapse of the Ukrainian economy and the 
progressive decline in the value of the hryvnia against the dollar meant that 
military spending remained stable in 2016, at the level of US$2.3 billion; and 
if the current budget is maintained, it will remain at this level in 2017 as well. 
Taking the high level of mobilisation of the Ukrainian army into account, this 
figure should be assessed as the critical minimum.
This minimum level of Ukrainian budgetary expenditure for military purpos-
es, in relation to the assumptions and tasks carried out, was achieved thanks 
to the efforts which the whole of Ukrainian society made. The main methods 
of fundraising include the imposition of additional taxes and voluntary de-
ductions directly related to funding the so-called anti-terrorist operation in 
the Donbas (mainly within the framework of the so-called Petro Poroshenko 
Fund, from which 350 million hryvnia was sent to the Ukrainian armed forces 
in the years 2014-16), as well as state guarantees of loans for companies meet-
ing defence orders. Despite this, the authorities in Kyiv failed to meet the 
defence spending level of at least 3% of GDP which they set in 2015. Realisti-
cally the figure oscillates around 2.5% of GDP, and the public declarations 
that this figure has been achieved or even exceeded (according to the Ukrain-
ian government, 3.1% of GDP has been set aside for defence in 20171) are not 
1 In the information given, the value of 5% of GDP was cited most frequently, which includes 
the total declared expenditure on internal security and defence. In some publications the 
value of 5% to was incorrectly stated as the expenditure on defence alone.
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confirmed in the financial data published by the Ukrainian defence ministry2. 
This situation is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. A renewed jump 
in Ukraine’s defence expenditure can only be expected if the country becomes 
involved in conflict on a scale comparable to or greater than that observed in 
the summer of 2014.
The budget of the Defence Ministry remains the main source of security for 
the operation of the Ukrainian armed forces, albeit not the only one. Starting 
in 2014, they have received assistance (material, hardware and training) from 
Western countries totalling $3 billion. The most active donors to the Ukrainian 
army include the United States (US military aid amounted to about US$600 
million in the years 2014-16, with another US$350 million scheduled for 2017), 
Canada and the United Kingdom, although the most generous donor has so 
far proved to be Japan (which in total has given equipment and supplies to the 
Ukrainian armed forces valued at US$1.85 billion). In the first period of the 
conflict, expenses for military purposes were also paid for with private funds, 
ranging from the soldiers sent to the Donbas and their families, to Ukraine’s 
oligarchs (led by Ihor Kolomoyskiy). However, at present it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to quantify the scale of expenditure from private sources.
Table 1. The budgets of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry in 2013-2017
 
2013
(performance)
2014
(plan)
2014
(performance)
2015
(plan)
2015
(performance)
2016
(plan)
2017
(plan)
Expenditure
in billions of 
hryvnia,
including:
15.2 * 14.6 27.1 46.7 49.3 55.6 64.4
-maintenance 12.5 12.0 21.8 30.6 36.9 40.9 49.8
-training 1.2 1.1 1.0 2.1 2.1 3.2 2.9
-investments 1.5 1.5 4.3 14.0 10.3 11.5 ** 11.7
2 The data given comes from the financial information of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry 
(published in the so-called ‘White Papers’, among others), and in some cases the calcula-
tions of GDP percentage based on them differ from those based on later information from 
the Finance Ministry concerning the implementation of the budget. The principal reason 
for these divergences is the differences in the exchange rate of the hryvnia to the US dol-
lar (at different time periods), which increased significantly, especially in the first several 
months after the Russian aggression began (2014-15).
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2013
(performance)
2014
(plan)
2014
(performance)
2015
(plan)
2015
(performance)
2016
(plan)
2017
(plan)
Expenditure
in US$ billion 
1.9 1.82 2.35 2.95 2.42 2.32 2.38
Percentage  
of GDP
1.11 *** 1.0 1.78 *** 2.53 2.67 *** 2.46 2.49
* planned: 15.3 billion hryvnia
** according to preliminary data, 8.1 billion hryvnia have actually been spent
*** according to calculations based on data from the Ministry of Finance of Ukraine (http://index.minfin.
com.ua/index/gdp/) the amount spent represented 1.04% of GDP (US$1.9 billion) in 2013, 1.73% of GDP 
(US$2.28 billion) in 2014, and 2.49% of GDP respectively (US$2.25 billion) in 2015
15
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III. manpower
The Ukrainian armed forces entered the war as a nominally professional struc-
ture, based on a contract system (conscription into compulsory military ser-
vice, which had been reduced from year to year, was finally abolished in 2013), 
although as early as the first weeks of combat it ran up against a lack of senior 
staff. A partial mobilisation allowed for a relatively rapid increase in troops 
on the ground during the hottest period of fighting in the Donbas, although 
under conditions of prolonged conflict this did not prove to be a reliable way 
of maintaining the necessary number of soldiers. However, it did contribute 
to exposing the deficiencies of the Ukrainian mobilisation system, and forced 
changes to that system. Whereas during the first waves of partial mobilisation 
in the spring of 2014, the number of volunteers completely covered the demand 
(the problem then was poor training or its total absence), the prolongation of the 
conflict and the public’s increasing awareness of its cost in deaths and injuries 
(as well as information about the terrible leadership and the poor conditions 
of service) led to the number of volunteers declining steadily, and it became 
common to avoid military service (contributing to corruption in the structures 
responsible for carrying out the mobilisation). The basis of all the waves of par-
tial mobilisation was an even distribution of effort throughout the country’s re-
gions, although even during the fourth wave it turned out that the main source 
of troops was central Ukraine (the Dnieper region), and that recruitment from 
the other regions – whether the Russian-speaking South and East, or western 
Ukraine, which saw itself as the cradle of Ukrainian patriotism – was decreas-
ing systematically3. As a result, the last two waves of partial mobilisation (the 
fifth and sixth in 2015) suffered a spectacular failure. The last group mobilised 
(in the sixth wave) completed their service in the autumn of 2016.
3 Among the leaders of the fourth and fifth wave of partial mobilisation were the Khmel-
nitsky, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia, Kirovohrad and Zaporizhia regions, as well as the city 
of Kyiv, whose mobilisation plan was fulfilled 80-100% (the record was Vinnytsia oblast, 
which achieved 100% mobilisation). At the opposite extreme are the Kharkiv, Chernivtsi, 
Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lugansk, Sumy, Ternopil and Transcarpathian regions, where 
the results of the mobilisation varied from 25 to 60%, and there were cases of the mu-
nicipal authorities refusing to give notice of the mobilisation and issue summons. Small 
changes on the mobilisation map of Ukraine occurred during the sixth wave, although it 
should be assumed that these were dictated by the general breakdown of the partial mobi-
lisation process. The other leaders were the Khmelnytsky, Vinnytsia and Dnipropetrovsk 
districts, which were joined by the Volyn and Zhytomyr districts (the mobilisation plans 
there reached 80-100%). The mobilisation plan can be said to have totally failed in the Iva-
no-Frankivsk (25% of the plan) and Transcarpathian districts (27% of the plan). Figures of 
below 40% were also reported in the Odessa and Sumy districts.
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The core of recruitment to the Ukrainian army is the service contract. This was 
aided by the significant (in Ukrainian terms) increase in salaries for contract 
soldiers (as of 2016), which in the situation of Ukraine’s economic collapses 
makes the armed forces one of the most attractive employers (especially for 
people from the provinces). In 2016, 69,000 people were accepted into contract 
service (including 7500 to officers’ posts), as were another 7000 by the middle 
of March 2017. However, it is worth noting that in 2016, only 12,000 of these 
soldiers had had any experience; these troops had served during the waves of 
partial mobilisation. In total, from the beginning of the conflict to November 
2016, recruitment into contract service amounted to 90,000 people, and the to-
tal number of active soldiers in the contract system reached 159,000 (including 
48,000 officers and 111,000 NCOs and privates), which is close to 80% of the full-
time positions in the Ukrainian army. If the observed trends are maintained, 
recruitment into service contracts will help raise the level of professionalism 
of the Ukrainian army’s personnel. However, it should be assumed that in the 
next few years, the number of new volunteers will be lower than in the peak 
year of 2016 (interest in contract service began to wane in the second half of 
2016), and will become increasingly dependent on the overall situation in the 
labour market.
Discussions about recruitment to the Ukrainian army cannot yet be considered 
closed. However, it should be assumed that giving up the goal of total profession-
alisation and maintaining a mixed system of recruitment, which the present 
leadership of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff have advocated, would 
– in a situation of threatened aggression against the entire territory of Ukraine – 
offer the country a better chance to make preparations and undertake defensive 
action. However, the relative success of the recruitment to contract service in 
2016 has contributed to the return to plans for the full professionalisation of 
the Ukrainian army (this is planned to happen by 2020, when 250,000 contract 
soldiers have been recruited); the continuation of the state of war in the Donbas 
and the military threat from Russia is likely to stop the Ukrainian authorities 
from abolishing conscription (in the current conditions, the above-mentioned 
plan for total professionalisation should at most be considered as a declaration 
of intent). In the foreseeable future, conscription (which was formally restored 
in spring 2014, and de facto in 2015), in its presently reduced form, will remain 
the primary means of preparing the reserves for mobilisation in the event of 
a conflict on a larger scale. 16-18,000 young men are called up annually for ba-
sic military service in the Ukrainian armed forces (more than 60% of the total 
number of conscripts; the rest go to the National Guard and the Interior Min-
istry’s Border Forces). In November 2016, the total number of conscripts in the 
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Ukrainian army was 19,200. The spring call-up in 2017 is scheduled to include 
9100 persons (14,100 together with the other power structures).
The Russian aggression has not only forced the Ukrainian armed forces to re-
turn to a mixed conscription-contract system for its recruitment, but also to 
double their numbers. Achieving the ceiling of 204,000 soldiers in full-time 
active service should be considered as the maximum effort for mobilisation 
which Ukraine can manage at the present time (as of the beginning of February 
2017, 37,000 soldiers have served in the anti-terrorist operation zone in the Don-
bas). This number guarantees that the armed status quo can be maintained at 
this level and, if Russia loses interest, the armed re-conquest of that part of the 
Donbas which is under the control of the separatists, although this figure would 
be insufficient to mount an effective self-defence if Russia launched full-scale 
aggression against Ukraine. The Ukrainian armed forces have an operational 
reserve of 130,000 men, relatively well trained and with real combat experi-
ence, who since 2016 have been moulded out of veterans of the Donbas (as well 
as from formations subordinate to the Interior Ministry). It must be stressed, 
however, that those counted in the reserve represent only half of the veterans 
of the anti-terrorist operation (by October 2016, 280,000 Ukrainians had served 
in the Donbas in all formations subordinate to the government in Kyiv, with 
266,000 reservists gaining combat status; at the beginning of February 2017, 
193,400 reservists were in the armed forces). Thanks to that, at least in terms 
of the human factor, it should be possible in a relatively short period of time to 
increase the Ukrainian army’s degree of combat readiness, as well as to fight 
a relatively close battle with a comparable opponent, something the Ukrainian 
armed forces were not capable of doing at the beginning of 2014.
The Ukrainian army has still not overcome its problems related to the collapse of 
discipline and morale, which were especially apparent during the Russian an-
nexation of Crimea and in the first period of the conflict in the Donbas. Despite 
significant progress in creating appropriate conditions of service, the nature of 
the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and the growing reluctance to participate in it, 
mean that the situation has little hope of improving in the foreseeable future. 
As of December 2016, 2,636 soldiers of the Ukrainian armed forces had been 
killed in the Donbas conflict (and 8,897 wounded); combat losses amounted to 
2148 killed (other formations, not subordinate to the Ukrainian Defence Min-
istry, had suffered a total of 428 soldiers killed and 1856 wounded). In the first 
quarter of 2017, a further 69 soldiers of the Ukrainian army were killed and 
420 wounded. Most of the combat losses are attributable to the hottest period of 
the conflict (summer 2014 to winter 2015), and the extension of trench warfare 
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in conditions conducive to the collapse of discipline and morale (even if only 
because of the constant criminal ‘trading’ over the front line and the observed 
participation of military personnel from both sides in this) has resulted in a rise 
in the number of deaths in non-combat conditions. In 2016, this figure exceeded 
the number of the Ukrainian side’s combat losses for the first time; 211 soldiers 
of the Ukrainian armed forces were killed in battle, while non-military losses 
amounted to 256 soldiers (mostly in various kinds of accidents, although as 
many as 63 committed suicide; there is no information on the number of mur-
ders and deaths which have occurred as part of the organisation and conduct of 
criminal activities, including smuggling across the demarcation line).
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IV. the organIsatIon of the ukraInIan armed 
forces
From its creation in 1992 until the start of the war in the Donbas, all the or-
ganisational and structural changes in the Ukrainian armed forces were based 
mainly on reducing the number of existing commands at the operational-stra-
tegic level (and also on lowering their ranks), as well as cutting the number of 
units. Despite the changes announced by Kyiv with regard to the perception of 
risks, and its focus on integration with NATO (which was initiated as early as 
Kuchma’s time in office), the locations of the most important commands and 
units have remained almost unchanged, based on the three former military 
districts of the Soviet army. Only in the situation of a real threat of Russian 
armed intervention did the government in Kyiv decide to make changes going 
above and beyond the existing reductions; the centre of gravity of the Ukrainian 
army’s command and control system was moved in an easterly direction. Some 
existing units were also relocated to districts bordering the annexed Crimean 
peninsula and the ATO zone in the Donbas, and new units were formed in Cen-
tral and Eastern Ukraine.
For the first time in Ukraine’s recent history, the Russian aggression against it 
has forced the government in Kyiv to create an operational-strategic headquar-
ters to take responsibility for all the potential war theatres. It is noteworthy that 
no Ukrainian command had previously taken de facto responsibility for defend-
ing the eastern and north-eastern areas (bordering on Russia). In the period 
2006-2013, the area of the former Kyiv military district of the Soviet army did 
not even have formal command status, and only the ‘North’ territorial directo-
rate (as distinct from the ‘West’ and ‘South’ commands then existing) had such 
a status. The 2013 reform of the command structure partially normalised the 
situation, leaving just two operational headquarters, North and South, in the 
structure of the Ukrainian armed forces. However, the North command was 
located in Rivne, and was traditionally oriented westwards.
The new military-administrative division of Ukraine was introduced in Janu-
ary 2015, and two operational headquarters were created on the Russian front: 
‘North’ in Chernihiv and ‘East’ at Dnipro City (the others are ‘West’ in Rivne and 
‘South’ in Odessa). Initially, however, the change only applied to the structures 
of the land forces and airmobile troops. The air force was organised as it had 
been before the war in the Donbas until January 2016, when three air commands 
(military air zones) were created for them: ‘West’, ‘South’ and ‘Centre’, the latter 
of which was responsible for the protection of the entire air space facing Russia. 
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Only in January 2017 was the ‘East’ command separated from the ‘Centre’, which 
helped unify the areas responsible for the basic types of the Ukrainian armed 
forces on individual operational-strategic fronts, and thus formed a basis for 
the formation of combined headquarters which could be linked up in the event 
of a full-scale regular armed conflict.
The most visible change in the organisation of the Ukrainian armed forces which 
was caused by the conflict in the Donbas is the increase in the number of units. 
The changes associated with this predominantly apply to the land forces, as well 
as to the Airmobile Troops brought in to complement them, and have virtu-
ally bypassed the other classes of Ukraine’s armed forces. This should be linked 
to the nature of the conflict in the Donbas (and hence the army’s operational 
needs); but also with the Ukrainian state’s limited options in terms of the forma-
tion, supply and preparation of personnel for the new formations of the air force 
(only one additional regiment of air defence has been created) and the navy. 
The latter was the only formation of the Ukrainian armed forces to have been 
reduced due to the loss to Russia of a substantial part of its potential and trained 
personnel after the annexation of Crimea (the command and main naval base 
have been moved from Sevastopol to Odessa), and its operational importance, 
particularly in light of the conflict in the Donbas, has become marginal. In to-
tal, since the start of the conflict, 17 new general military and combat support 
brigades have been or are being created (the most created at one time was 11, in 
2015), and the total number of developed tactical compounds in the Ukrainian 
armed forces has risen from 21 (at the start of 2014) to 37 (at the start of 2017), 
which together with the newly created units makes a total of 46 brigades. In 
addition, at least 5 separate battalions and divisions have been created; in part 
these form the basis for the brigades created later. In this regard, investments 
have also been made in the structures of security activities, with the creation 
of one new brigade (engineers), 6 regiments and 11 independent battalions. The 
formation of so many new units, in conditions where there are problems with 
equipment, training and personnel exchanges in already existing units, has met 
with criticism from advocates of the professionalisation of the Ukrainian armed 
forces. The decision to create new command units was taken in a situation of an 
imminent threat of full-scale military aggression by Russia, and was thus con-
cerned with the need to secure the defence of at least two operational-strategic 
fronts, and as such must be regarded as entirely understandable.
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Table 2. The number of developed tactical groups in the Ukrainian armed 
forces in the years 2014-2017 (existing and newly-created general military and 
support formations; state at the beginning of the year)
  Armoured brigades
Mechanised 
brigades
Motorised 
brigades
Mountain 
infantry 
brigades
Airmobile 
brigades
Marine 
infantry 
brigades
Army 
aviation 
brigades
Artillery 
brigade
2014 2 6 - 1 4 - 3 4
2015 3 9 2 2 5 1 * 3 6
2016 4 12 4 2 6 1 4 7
2017 5 14 4 3 8 1 4 7
* Created on the basis of the subunits of the withdrawn from Crimea, including the former coastal defen-
ce brigade.
The Special Operations Forces, a new element in the structure of the Ukrain-
ian armed forces, which was formed in response to the current nature of the 
conflict in the Donbas (with a significant role played by irregular actions), was 
immediately raised to the rank of an independent branch of the armed forces 
(in accordance with similar trends observed in the armies of NATO). They were 
formed on 5 January 2016, but their actual organisation only began at the end of 
2016. Unlike the trends observed in NATO armies, Ukraine’s Special Operations 
Forces have received an extremely strong component responsible for psycho-
logical operations, which should also be associated with the specific nature of 
the conflict in the Donbas. It was created on the basis of units which have been 
redeployed from other classes of armed forces, and their core is made up of 
2 spetsnaz regiments, 2 special operations centres (including one from the navy) 
and 4 information and operations centres. As of now the command-personnel 
structures have been created, and the units are being supplied (as of December 
2016); the recruitment and training of personnel is also underway (this is being 
carried out according to NATO standards, within the framework of courses led 
by instructor from NATO countries). We should assume that the first Special 
Operations Forces will be operationally ready in the course of 2017.
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V. traInIng
One of the weakest elements of the Ukrainian army’s functioning before the 
outbreak of the conflict in the Donbas was the training of troops. The small 
number of exercises carried out were most frequently organised as parts of the 
Ukrainian army’s cooperation with NATO, and these multilateral projects were 
of a relatively low tactical level. Senior exercises were limited to the command 
and senior staff levels, and the vast majority of the Ukrainian army’s soldiers 
did not participate in any training exercises at all. The deficiencies in training 
(for soldiers, officers and NCOs) should be considered as one of the basic reasons 
for the defeats and losses which the Ukrainian army suffered in the first months 
of the conflict. The latter in particular forced the Ukrainian command to place 
a greater emphasis on training. Considering that it still remains on the margins 
of the Ukrainian armed forces’ financing (the significant decline in the value of 
the hryvnia means that expenditure on training in US dollars has fallen even in 
comparison to the period before the outbreak of the Donbas conflict), we should 
assume that the projects being implemented – whose numbers have actually 
increased (in large part because of the increase in the size of the Ukrainian 
army) – will mainly come down to soldiers’ physical training and the maximum 
use of post-Soviet stocks of ammunition. This should be regarded as sufficient 
in preparing the army for combat in the Donbas (the actions carried out there 
over the past two years have not gone beyond the subunit level); the problems 
arise when preparing for possible full-scale, regular armed conflict. Admittedly 
the leadership of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry has announced a significant 
increase in the number of high-level (brigade) exercises, of the kind which had 
not been held at all until 2014. However, it should be assumed that in the opera-
tional dimension, these will lead to projects for command and senior staff, and 
their exercise aspect will ultimately consist of no more than a series of loosely 
related exercises for the subunits. We should consider the main task of these 
exercises to be the synchronisation of the soldiers remaining in active service 
with the reservists called up for training (especially after the creation of the 
operational reserve). In 2016, 40,000 reservists were involved in such projects; 
in 2017 up to 80,000 are scheduled to be trained. In 2016, the Ukrainian army 
also resumed the organisation of operational-strategic exercises (four were car-
ried out in total, including the largest and most publicised Rubezh [Border] 2016), 
but in terms of military training, these consisted of a range of lower-ranking 
projects (at brigade and battalion levels, among others).
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Table 3. Number of brigade- and battalion-level exercises in the Ukrainian 
armed forces in the years 2014-17
  2014 2015 2016 2017
Brigade exercises 0 9 17 25
Battalion exercises 17 69 93 No data
The situation in the air force has significantly improved in terms of numbers. 
However, the main reason for the substantial increase in the average num-
ber of hours flown by Ukrainian pilots is the supply and security operations 
in the Donbas, which favours the crews of transport aircraft and helicopters 
(NB. the data provided by Ukraine does not refer to individual airmen, but to 
whole crews; combat flights over the Donbas were de facto suspended after the 
losses incurred by Ukrainian air power in the spring and summer of 2014). It 
is noteworthy that while the number of flying hours has risen (up to 98 hours 
per year per crew in the peak year of 2015; until 2014 the average had been 
25 hours), the number of flights in the field of combat training with weapons 
has fallen dramatically (effectively down to zero in the case of training in at-
tacking air targets with rockets; only every third air combat exercise ends in 
a simulation of firing rockets), and only training in shooting at ground targets 
remains at a relatively stable level (about 400 per year; however these exercises 
do not include bombing, which is only occasionally practiced). The only fully 
valid air defence exercises are carried out on the ground by rocket air defence 
subunits, albeit on a small scale (a few per year, in order to check the condition 
of the missiles). In a situation of regular conflict and clashes with the air forces 
of a potential opponent (in this case Russia), the capacity of the Ukrainian air 
defence system must be regarded as inadequate at even a minimum level (this 
is caused not only by a lack of resources for training, but also by technical prob-
lems within the air fleet).
In this situation, the rise in support from NATO countries is one of the most 
important elements of training for the Ukrainian armed forces. It is notewor-
thy that whereas the Ukrainian Defence Ministry has not included the costs 
associated with this in the total expenditure on training (it is not counted as 
budgetary spending), it does include them in the plans and results of the train-
ing. Western assistance most often consists of basic combat training for the de-
tachments, at least some of which should be included in the declared increase in 
the number of battalion exercises. This assistance is led by the Americans, who 
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at first primarily undertook the training of detachments of the new National 
Guard, although as of 2016 they laid primary emphasis on cooperation with the 
Ukrainian armed forces. The plan until 2020 assumes the training of an aver-
age of five battalions of the Ukrainian army (land forces and airmobile troops; 
detachments of the Special Operations Forces are being trained under separate 
agreements) per year (in 2016, six battalions were trained, a total of 3000 sol-
diers; for comparison, during this period American instructors trained three 
battalions of the National Guard). The training of the Ukrainian army is also 
being undertaken by British and Canadians, who are mainly involved in pre-
paring basic soldiers (among others, they trained 1254 NCOs in 2016, together 
with the Americans). Polish instructors also participate in the American-led 
Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine (from the 21st Mountain Infantry 
Brigade). The Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) should 
also be considered as training support; they reached full operational capacity 
in January 2017. International exercises remain relevant to the general level of 
the Ukrainian armed forces’ training; the US is the most important partner in 
these as well. It is planned for at least 12,500 Ukrainian soldiers to participate 
in these during 2017 (primarily in the Ukrainian-American ‘Sea Breeze’ and 
‘Rapid Trident’ exercises).
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VI. equIpment
Until the war in the Donbas, the Ukrainian army had been operating in a dis-
astrous technical condition. Only the equipment of units participating in mis-
sions outside of Ukraine and international exercises was maintained to an 
appropriate degree. The equipment’s technical condition was one of the most 
important reasons (apart from the soldiers’ poor training) for the army’s sig-
nificant losses, particularly in the first period of the conflict. Of the c. 800 ar-
moured fighting vehicles (tanks, armoured combat vehicles, self-propelled ar-
tillery, etc.) lost by the Ukrainian armed forces during the first two years of the 
Donbas war (April 2014 until April 2016), around half of them were abandoned 
by the crew, usually in circumstances of technical failure (and sometimes of 
slight damage by enemy fire), and fell into the hands of the separatists. The 
situation was not helped by the long-time cannibalisation of arms and military 
equipment, or by the mass sell-off of equipment (Ukraine sold most weapons in 
the 1990s, although in the period 2005-14 it exported 832 tanks, 714 armoured 
combat vehicles, 202 planes and 232 helicopters, among others, as well as up to 
28,500 pieces of various types of artillery systems and rockets; for comparison, 
in 2014 the Ukrainian armed forces were armed with 723 tanks, 2426 armoured 
combat vehicles, 523 artillery systems, 187 planes and 80 helicopters), initially 
from storehouses (almost from the moment Ukraine became independent), and 
(starting from the last decade) increasingly from front-line Ukrainian army 
units as well. After the necessary funding was allocated, based on its technical 
database (the arms industry as developed during the Soviet era), the Ukrain-
ian army undertook the least expensive repair and overhaul processes possi-
ble which would allow it to tackle the most serious problems. By the battle of 
Debaltsevo in winter 2015, Ukrainian troops already had equipment at their 
disposal which was predominantly in good working order, although it was by 
no means the latest or most modern.
In 2014-5, repair and overhaul was undertaken on a massive scale, in the order of 
thousands of units of heavy weapons and military equipment annually (mainly 
combat vehicles, artillery, transport, and reconnaissance & communications). 
It must be stressed, however, that the same pieces were being renovated again 
and again, refurbished or repaired before being sent to the front in the Donbas, 
and then withdrawn due to damage or breakdowns which could not be repaired 
on the spot. In 2016, the amount of repaired and refurbished equipment de-
creased significantly, which should be associated with the relative calming and 
stabilisation of the situation in the conflict zone, as well as a drop in low-cost 
opportunities for repair (thanks to the depletion of spare parts accumulated 
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from the Soviet era, and a drastic fall in the number of units that could be can-
nibalised – mostly unsold, stored weapons and military equipment which had 
been preserved, renovated and distributed to the army in order to make up 
for losses and to equip the newly-formed units). However, these activities al-
lowed for the newly-developed units of the Land Forces and Airmobile Troops, 
on which the main burden of the actions in the Donbas rested, to be resupplied 
to almost 100%. The Air Forces’ needs, in terms of necessary repairs and renova-
tions, were only given serious consideration in 2014, during the real threat of 
full-scale Russian armed aggression (along with the upgraded equipment, the 
Ukrainian army received 120 operational aeroplanes and helicopters). Mean-
while, the Navy had been almost completely overlooked (it only received six 
refurbished units in 2016, and for the first time in many years two new ships, 
small Giurza-M type artillery boats, which can at best serve for patrol tasks on 
coastal waters).
Despite the increase in the number of new and upgraded units purchased of 
arms and military equipment, compared to the period prior to the conflict (pro-
curement from 1992-2013 was sporadic and mainly consisted of small batches), 
their quantity – considering the issue of the Ukrainian armed forces’ technical 
modernisation – should be considered as very far from sufficient. The annual 
delivery of a few dozen (in the case of the land formations) and (really) barely 
a dozen or so (in the case of aviation) units of different types of weapons only 
allowed individual companies to rearm (in the case of the Land Forces), and 
a maximum of flights (up to 4) in the case of the Air Forces. In addition, in 
the case of heavy weapons, these were only upgraded units, not new (although 
the batch of the new BTR-4 armoured personnel carriers was an exception). 
However, it should be admitted that one positive aspect, helping to promote 
patriotic attitudes and raising the troops’ morale, was the way in which even 
small quantities of new and modernised weaponry have been handed over to the 
military during widely publicised ceremonies in which the highest authorities 
of the state, led by the President of Ukraine, have participated; these ceremonies 
occur every few months (most recently in October 2016), and so far a total of 157 
pieces – often small-arms – of weapons and military equipment has been handed 
over to the Ukrainian armed forces).
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Table 4. Number of units of military weaponry, basic categories (according to 
the CFE) purchased/upgraded and repaired/refurbished (numbers in brack-
ets) in 2013-17
  2013 2014 2015 2016
2017 
(plan)
Tanks
Armoured combat 
vehicles
- (no data) 54 (4088) 31 (3196) 68 (900 *)
no data 
(no data)
Artillery of cali-
bre 100 mm and 
above
- (no data) 18 (670) - (1743) - (*)
no data 
(no data)
Planes and heli-
copters
2 (no data) 8 (109) 20 (19) 19 (64) 20 (40)
* total number of armoured combat vehicles and artillery systems
In a situation of armed conflict, on the other hand, where the depletion of the 
post-Soviet resources of armaments and military equipment is increasingly ap-
parent, the Ukrainian army has completely departed from the standardisation 
of hardware which had been progressing in parallel to the professionalisation 
of its personnel, and has begun to use almost all the available resources, whose 
technical and tactical virtues were demonstrated by their use on the Donbas 
front (the equipment returned to service included previously withdrawn T-72 
tanks and Mi-2 helicopters which had not found buyers, as well as cannons 
and towed howitzers of types used in the final period of World War II, which 
had been decommissioned before the breakup of the Soviet Union; one extreme 
case saw the reintroduction of a Maxim Mk 1915 machine gun). It also became 
established procedure to extend the period of a piece’s usage beyond its permit-
ted service life, especially in the case of the most expensive precision weapons 
(most of the missiles the Ukrainian army used in the Donbas should have been 
decommissioned in the previous decade at least). This kind of action will cer-
tainly help the Ukrainian armed forces to make up its deficiencies in a short 
period; eventually, however, it will increasingly complicate the issues of logis-
tical security, in the first place, with regard to the maintenance of arms and 
military equipment. From the perspective of the life and health of the soldiers 
themselves, this use of repeatedly renewed weaponry is a separate issue.
It was only at the end of 2016 that the situation, in terms of the security of 
the basic needs of the technical forces participating in the counter-terrorism 
28
O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 0
7/
20
17
operations, was declared sufficiently well-adjusted for the state to return to 
developing its long-term armaments policy. Testament to this was the adoption 
by the Council for the National Security and Defence of Ukraine of the pro-
ject for the state’s programme to develop the Ukrainian armed forces by 2020 
(the previous plan from 2006, which was amended in 2011-12, has de facto not 
been implemented). The programme’s main goal is for the Ukrainian army to 
meet the technical standards for membership in NATO. Considering the above-
mentioned financial considerations and the potential of the Ukrainian arms 
industry, this assumption must be regarded as no more than a declaration of 
intent. The government’s awareness of these conditions is demonstrated by the 
inclusion of specific purchases or weapons upgrades in separate programmes. 
In the case of the Navy, which has been the most neglected of the armed forces 
in recent years, the plans to modernise it should be treated first and foremost as 
a rescue program for the Ukrainian shipbuilding industry (a state programme 
for constructing corvette-class ships, project 58250, was adopted in parallel 
with the aforementioned programme for military development).
An insurmountable barrier in the process of the technical modernisation of 
the Ukrainian armed forces – which is a fundamental matter, unlikely to be 
resolved in the foreseeable future – is the still insufficient level of funding. After 
its peak in 2015, expenditure on the purchase and modernisation of weapons 
(not to mention research and development work) was once again restricted (be-
cause of the progressive decline in the value of the hryvnia, the delay in the 
transfer of funds, and even their periodic interruption in 2016, expenditure for 
this purpose fell by over 60% compared to 2015). This situation should improve 
in 2017, although the budget assigns a similar amount for investment to that 
expected in 2016 (11.7 billion hryvnia, of which 9 billion hryvnia [US$333 mil-
lion] will go directly to armament and military equipment), which even in the 
case of the programme’s full implementation will not translate into a qualitative 
change. The Ukrainian arms companies based at the Ukroboronprom state enter-
prise (which number 105, of which only 56 showed a profit in 2016, and 6 were 
marked for liquidation) have stated that, even if they receive adequate funding, 
they could only begin regular supplies of new and upgraded types of weapons 
and military equipment towards the end of this decade (no earlier than 2018). 
It should be noted that, despite the domestic boom in armament and military 
equipment sales associated with the Donbas conflict, the Ukrainian arms in-
dustry still exists thanks mainly to its exports (in 2014-16 Ukroboronprom signed 
contracts to export military goods valued at US$3.8 billion; in 2016, exports 
amounted to US$756 million). In the present financial and technical conditions, 
and with regard to the relatively modest plans announced for the future, the 
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process of modernising the Ukrainian army has no chance of being started or 
implemented in the foreseeable future (before the year 2020).
As with the insufficient funding, the prospects for technical modernisation 
are affected by the Ukrainian arms industry’s limited options with regard to 
its closed production cycles (i.e. the dependence on importing what are often 
the most important components and assemblies), as well as the acquisition and 
application of the latest technologies. Although the Ukrainian armed forces re-
ceive new types of arms and military equipment every year (15 in 2015, 17 in 
2016), they do not represent the latest generations or the basic categories (es-
pecially in terms of heavy weapons and precision weapons). Only the Dozor-B 
armoured car and the 120-mm Molot mortar deserve to be included on the in-
ventory, as these are now probably the most serious items that the Ukrainian 
arms industry is able to produce entirely independently from scratch. All the 
basic types of arms and military equipment produced in Ukraine (it should be 
noted that Ukraine does not produce combat aircraft or helicopters at all) are 
based on old technologies (often from the mid-20th century, such as the T-64 
Bulat main battle tank), or alternatively they use imported components and sub-
assemblies (for example, BTR-4 APCs), which are unlikely to be replaced in the 
foreseeable future, considering the levels at which their Ukrainian counterparts 
are currently financed. So far Ukraine’s efforts to decouple from imports (or to 
find alternative sources to Russia – the Russian military-industrial complex was 
and still remains the Ukrainian arms industry’s largest contractor) have trans-
lated into products of lower quality than before (the Molot) or which have high 
failure rates (the BTR-4). The periodically announced attempts to create new 
products (the tactical operational missile Grom-2, based on the Soviet Tochka-U, 
which is intended to be the Ukrainian equivalent of the Russian Iskander; the 
Olkha 300-mm multiple rocket launcher, based on the Soviet Smerch) should 
be primarily treated as offers for potential investors (until recently the Grom 
project was co-financed by Saudi Arabia) or as a ‘propaganda of strength’ (at-
tempts to develop the Olkha system had to be made when stocks of rockets for 
the Smerch system used by the Ukrainian army ran out). In such a situation, the 
launch of the production in Ukraine of American M16 rifles announced for 2017 
(as part of the transition to NATO standards), at least during the first period of 
their introduction to the Ukrainian army, will not improve the situation, and 
will only trigger the chaos associated with the need to distribute ammunition 
and spare parts for assault rifles of two different types of construction.
Two years after the official termination of cooperation between the Russian 
and Ukrainian arms industries, the Ukrainian army is effectively unable to 
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function without making purchases from Russia. Without the continual im-
port of components and spare parts, the first machines to be grounded are the 
helicopters, which undergo continual use as part of the anti-terrorist operation 
(though they are no longer used in combat actions since the losses incurred in 
2014), as are most of the APCs and KrAZ trucks (which have Russian engines) 
in the Donbas. To a greater (planes) or lesser degree (armoured weapons), the 
functioning of most Ukrainian weapons and military equipment is dependent 
on Russian (or post-Soviet) components (even the manufacturer of the entirely 
Ukrainian Dozor-B from Lviv imports its armour plates from Russia). The em-
bargo means that imports are organised by a network of intermediaries, with 
the substantial participation of companies from Belarus, and to a proportionally 
lesser degree from Moldova. Ukrainian counter-espionage necessarily tolerates 
violations of the embargo (cooperation in exports, mainly of Ukrainian engines 
for Russian helicopters and ships, remains de facto legal), the more so as one of 
the intermediary companies is Bogdan Motors, which has ties to President Petro 
Poroshenko (it also handles contracts to supply the Ukrainian army with Chi-
nese ambulances and Belarusian trucks). An extreme example is the Ukrainian 
army’s use of types of diesel oil produced in Russia and designed for military ve-
hicles; in autumn 2016 Russia temporarily halted deliveries because... Ukraine 
had arbitrarily changed the intermediate company which it had been using.
The Import of weapons and military equipment and components from the West, 
as well as their acquisition for free as part of the West’s assistance, is of marginal 
importance for the needs of the Ukrainian army (the exceptions are the equip-
ment for the soldiers’ personal use and dual-purpose equipment, supplied in 
relatively large quantities). The nominal value of these contracts significantly 
exceeds the value of domestic contracts (in 2016, a total of about 40 contracts in 
the amount of US$1.5 billion), although this does not change their importance, 
and the vast majority of them have been implemented within the framework of 
the military aid. So far, it has been dominated by vehicles, observation equip-
ment, communications equipment, artillery radars and electronic warfare sys-
tems (the main suppliers are the United States, and to a lesser extent the United 
Kingdom and Canada) and medical equipment (Japan). Significant one-off sup-
port in the first period of the conflict (2014-15) was provided to the Ukrainian 
army by the United Kingdom (Saxon APCs), Bulgaria (ammunition) and the 
Czech Republic (uniforms).
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summary
In 1992, the newly created Ukrainian armed forces, by taking over three of 
the four military districts of the Soviet army’s strategic second line, acquired 
the reputation as one of the most powerful armed formations in the world. In 
the common perception, not even the abandonment of nuclear weapons has 
changed that. Third-party observers have not paid much attention to the fact 
that the potential gathered under the banner of the Ukrainian armed forces is 
only a fragment of a former military superpower, which has not yet been able 
to become the army of a sovereign state, either in terms of organisation or per-
sonnel. Their subsequent development and operation has indicated that these 
were in effect still the same three (now post-Soviet) military districts, func-
tioning on a kind of momentum from the past, whose potential was declining 
year on year, thanks to the sales of its arms and military equipment, and the 
reduction in number of its units and personnel. The actual framework of the 
Ukrainian army consisted of a few subunits seconded to work with the armed 
forces of NATO countries, which took part in operations under the Alliance’s 
aegis. However, the attempt to move this cooperation in a more tactical direc-
tion ended in a spectacular failure; the soldiers of the Ukrainian Brigade who 
were sent on a mission to Iraq mainly involved themselves in private business, 
effectively leaving the flank of the Multinational Division exposed. The true 
face of the Ukrainian armed forces was revealed by the Russian annexation of 
Crimea and the first weeks of the war in the Donbas – they were nothing more 
than a fossilised structure, unfit for any effective function upon even a mini-
mum engagement with the enemy, during which a significant part of the troops 
only realised whom they were representing in the course of the conflict... and 
more than once, from the perspective of service in one of the post-Soviet mili-
tary districts, they chose to serve in the Russian army.
The war in the Donbas shaped the Ukrainian army. It gave awareness and mo-
tivation to the soldiers, and forced the leadership of the Defence Ministry and 
the government of the state to adapt the army’s structure – for the first time 
since its creation – to real operational needs, and also to bear the costs of halting 
the collapses in the fields of training and equipment, at least to such an extent 
which would allow the army to fight a close battle with the pro-Russian sepa-
ratists. Despite all these problems, the Ukrainian armed forces of the year 2017 
now number 200,000, most of whom have come under fire, and are seasoned in 
battle. They have a trained reserve ready for mobilisation in the event of a larger 
conflict; their weapons are not the latest or the most modern, but the vast major-
ity of them now work properly; and they are ready for the defence of the vital 
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interests of the state (even if some of the personnel still care primarily about 
their own vested interests). They have no chance of winning a potential military 
clash with Russia, but they have a reason to fight. The Ukrainian armed forces of 
the year 2014, in a situation where their home territory was occupied by foreign 
troops, were incapable of mounting an adequate response. The changes since 
the Donbas war started mean that Ukraine now has the best army it has ever 
had in its history.
Andrzej Wilk
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Appendix 1. notes on sources
The specific nature of the work of the Centre for Eastern Studies means that this 
text has been researched exclusively on the basis of publicly available sources, 
although this information has allowed a relatively complete and verifiable pres-
entation of the changes in the Ukrainian army since the launch of the Russian 
aggression. The government in Kyiv – regardless of who is in charge of it – have 
conducted one of the most transparent policies in military matters, and any 
activities related to all the possible pathologies within the structures of the 
armed forces and the Ukrainian Defence Ministry are regularly disclosed in 
Ukrainian media (both Ukrainian- and Russian-speaking). Paradoxically, the 
potentially dangerous leakage of adverse information regarding the defence 
of the state is the responsibility of soldiers and officials themselves. A bigger 
problem is informational chaos, in which the reports submitted tend to conflict 
with each other, not so much because of deliberate attempts at misinformation, 
but rather because of the mistakes and errors made in the process of their (often 
hectic) preparation.
Most of the information contained in this report comes from documents and 
statements by representatives of the Ukrainian authorities (including local au-
thorities) and the leadership of the Ukrainian army, as provided on the follow-
ing websites:
 – the President of Ukraine (http://www.president.gov.ua/);
 – the parliament of Ukraine (http://rada.gov.ua/; its website includes 
a search engine for legal acts: http://zakon0.rada.gov.ua/laws) and its 
press organ Holos Ukrainy (http://www.golos.com.ua/);
 – the Defence Ministry of Ukraine (http://www.mil.gov.ua/);
 – the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine (http://www.
rnbo.gov.ua/).
Information on current events has been sourced from generally available news 
agencies:
 – Unian (http://www.unian.ua/);
 – Interfax-Ukraine (http://ua.interfax.com.ua/.
Despite being under the control of the Moscow headquarters of Interfax (via the 
Interfax Information Service Group), the Interfax-Ukraine agency is a relatively 
reliable source of information on current events.
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In order to increase the readability of the text, footnotes have only been added 
in cases in which the information needs clarification deviating from the funda-
mental content. Reference to official reports only appears in cases of ambiguity 
or discrepancies relevant to the problem under discussion.
Despite the importance which changes in the armed forces’ personnel has for 
the current security situation of Ukraine, they have not as yet formed the topic 
of a major report for public consumption. Only partially – due to the publisher 
and the nature of the publication – do such studies fill the role of the annually 
published ‘White Paper’ of the Ukrainian Defence Ministry (http://www.mil.
gov.ua/diyalnist/bila-kniga.html).
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Appendix 2. Structure and home bases of the Land Forces, Airmobile 
Troops and Marine Corps (general military units and support units)
grouping unit home base notes
Operational Com-
mand ‘West’ (Rivne)
10. Mtn.Inf.Bde. * Kolomyia
nominally 
mountain-assault
14. Mech.Bde. ** Volodymyr-Volynskyi  
24. Mech.Bde. Javoriv  
128. Mtn.Inf.Bde. Mukachevo/Uzhhorod  
44. Art.Bde. *** Ternopil towed artillery
39. AD.Rgt. ****** Volodymyr-Volynskyi  
Operational Com-
mand ‘North’ 
(Chernihiv)
1. Arm.Bde. **** Honcharivskie  
30. Mech.Bde. Novohrod-Volynskyi  
58. Mot.Bde.  ***** Sumy/Konotop  
72. Mech.Bde. Bila Tserkva  
26. Art.Bde. Berdychiv
self-propelled 
artillery
1129. AD.Rgt. Bila Tserkva  
Operational Com-
mand ‘East’ (Dnipro)
 
17. Arm.Bde. Kryvyi Rih  
53. Mech.Bde. Severodonetsk  
54. Mech.Bde. Bakhmut  
92. Mech.Bde. Bashkyrivka  
93. Mech.Bde. Cherkaskie  
55. Art.Bde. Zaporizhia towed artillery
1039. AD.Rgt. Hvardijske  
Operational 
Command ‘South’ 
(Odessa)
28. Mech.Bde. Chornomorske  
56. Mot.Bde. Myrne  
57. Mot.Bde. Kropyvnytskyi  
59. Mot.Bde. Haisyn  
40. Art.Bde. Pervomaysk towed artillery
38. AD.Rgt. Nova Odessa  
Central 
subordination
19. R.Bde. ******* Khmelnytskyi  
27. RA.Bde. *******
Sumy  
43. Art.Bde. Divychky
so-called great 
power; self-
propelled
15. RA.Rgt. ********* Drohobych  
107. RA.Rgt. Kremenchuk  
11. A.Avn.Bde. ********** Chornobayivka  
12.  A.Avn.Bde. Kaliniv Novy  
16.  A.Avn.Bde. Brody  
18. A.Avn.Bde. Poltava  
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grouping unit home base notes
4. Army Corps 
(reserves)
3. Arm.Bde.   being created
5. Arm.Bde.  
posted to the 
operational 
command ‘South’
14. Arm.Bde.   being created
15. Mech.Bde.  
being created; 
posted to the 
operational 
command ‘South’
33. Mech.Bde.    
60. Mech.Bde.  
posted to the 
operational 
command ‘South’
61. Mech.Bde.   being created
62. Mtn.Inf.Bde.    
63. Mech.Bde.   being created
45. Art.Bde.   towed artillery
Airmobile Troops
25. Abn.Bde. *********** Hvardiyskie  
45. Air.Asslt.Bde. Bolhrad  
46. Air.Asslt.Bde. Poltava  
79. Air.Asslt.Bde. Mykolaiv  
80. Air.Asslt.Bde. Lviv  
81. Ambl.Bde. 
*************
Druzhkivka  
82. Ambl.Bde.  
posted to the 
operational 
command ‘South’
95. Air.Asslt.Bde. Zhytomyr  
Navy Command
36. Nav.Inf.Bde. 
**************
Mykolaiv  
406. Art.Bde. Mykolaiv  
32. RA.Rgt. Altestove  
* Mountain Infantry Brigade
** Mechanised Brigade
*** Artillery Brigade
**** Armoured Brigade
***** Motorised Brigade
****** Air Defence Missile Regiment
******* Missile Brigade
******** Rocket Artillery Brigade
********* Rocket Artillery Regiment
********** Army Aviation Brigade
*********** Airborne Brigade
************ Air Assault Brigade
************* Airmobile Brigade
************** Naval Infantry Brigade
The task of the units posted to operational command ‘South’ is to safeguard the 
territory of Ukraine from occupied Crimea.
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 Structure and home bases of the Air Forces and naval Aviation
grouping unit home base notes
Air Command ‘West’ 
(Lviv)
114. Avn.Bde. * Ivano-Frankivsk MiG-29
11. AD.Rgt. Shepetivka Buk-M1
223. AD.Rgt. Stryi Buk-M1
540. AD.Rgt. Kamianka Buzka S-200, S-300
Air Command ‘Centre’ 
(Vasylkiv)
40. Avn.Bde. Vasylkiv MiG-29
831. Avn.Bde. Myrhorod Su-27
96. AD.Bde. ** Danylivka S-200, S-300
138. AD.Bde. Dnipro S-300
156. AD.Rgt. Zolotonosha Buk-M1
Air Command ‘South’ 
(Odessa)
204. Avn.Bde. Kulbakyne MiG-29
299. Avn.Bde. Kulbakyne Su-25
160. AD.Bde. Odessa S-300
208. AD.Bde. Kherson S-300
201. AD.Rgt. Pervomaisk S-300
Air Command ‘East’ 
(Dnipro)
 
no assigned 
combat units 
and support
Central subordination 7. Avn.Bde.
Starokonstan-
tyniv
Su-24 m, 
Su-24MR
Navy Command
10. Nav.Avn.Bde. 
***
Mykolaiv  
* Tactical Aviation Brigade
** Air Defence Missile Brigade
*** Naval Aviation Brigade
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Appendix 3. The equipment of the Ukrainian armed forces (the basic 
categories of armaments according to the Treaty on Conventional 
Armed Forces in europe), as of the beginning of 2017
tanks
combat 
infantry 
vehicles
apcs artillery of calibre 100 mm and above
combat 
aircraft
combat 
helicopters
By type (in the case of artillery)
T-64* – 710 BMP-1 – 193 BTR-3 – 90
cannons and towed 
howitzers –1015 ****
MiG-29 – 37 Mi-24 – 35
T-72 – 70
BMP-2 – 
890
BTR-4 – 78 Mortars – 310 ***** Su-27 – 34  
T-80 – 22 BMD-1 – 15 BTR-70 – 215
Cannon and self-pro-
pelled howitzers – 572 
******
Su-25 – 31  
T-84  
Oplot – 10
BMD-2 – 15 BTR-80 – 93
Multi-missile launch-
ers – 360 *******
Su-24M – 14  
    BTR-D – 15   Su-24MR – 9  
    Saxon** – 40      
total 
812 1113 531*** 2257 125 35
* post-Soviet T-64BWs and upgraded T-64BM Bulats
** In addition, 35 vehicles as command vehicles
*** In addition, c. 1500 MT-LB tracked transporters, used as security vehicles and artillery tractors
**** including 152 mm: 2A36 Hiatsynt-B (180 units), 2A65 Msta-B (130 units), D-20 (130 units), 122 mm: 
D-30 (75 units), 100 mm (AP): T-12 Rapira (500 units)
***** including 120 mm: 2S12 Sani (190 units), M120-15 Molot (120 units)
****** including 203 mm: 2S7 Pion (6 units.), 152 mm: 2S3 Akatsia (235 units), 2S5 Hiatsynt -S (18 units), 
2S19 Msta-S (35 units), 122 mm: 2S1 Gozdik (238 units), 120 mm: 2S9 Nona (40 units)
******* including 300 mm: 9K58 Smerch (75 units), 220 mm: 9K57 Uragan (70 units), 122 mm: BM-21 Grad 
(185), 9K55 Grad-1 (18 units), Bastion-01 (12 units.)
In addition, the Land Forces also have up to 90 9K79-1 Tochka-U operational-
tactical missile launchers with a range of 120 km (12 of which are in the 19th 
Missile Brigade, the others are in storage).
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naval ships of Ukraine
frigate corvettes
class 
landing 
platform 
dock
the boats 
rocket 
& artillery
amphibious 
boats trawlers
By type
project 1135-1 
(‘Hetman 
Sahaidachny’)
project 
1124 m-1 
(‘Vinnytsya’)
project 
773-1 (‘Yuri 
Olefirenko’)
project 
206MR *-1 
(‘Pryluky’)
project 1176-1 
(‘Svatove’)
project 
1258E-1 
(‘Henichesk’)
     
project 1400 m-1 
(‘Skadovsk’)
   
     
Project B-376-3 
(‘Rivne’, AK-02, 
AK-03)
   
     
project 58155 
Giurza-M-2 
(‘Akkerman’, 
‘Berdiansk’)
   
total 
1 1 1 7 1 1
* The only missile boat in the structure of the Ukrainian Navy; the other units are only artillery boats
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